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1  Introduction 
The knowledge of the patterns of inter-country propagation of economic shocks and the 
degree of vulnerability of a particular country to shocks originating from other countries 
is crucial for sound macroeconomic management. The relative robustness of the Indian 
and  the  Chinese  economies  to  the  recent  Asian  crisis  has  been  remarkable.  The 
availability of this sort of information is particularly important for Central Banks because 
they design and implement monetary policy mandates for price stability and GDP growth 
on a day-to-day basis. Because of these reasons, there is a growing interest in the sources 
of  macroeconomic  fluctuations  and  transmission  of  shocks  in  an  international 
perspective.  However,  most  of  the  research  in  this  area  has  traditionally  focused  on 
industrialized countries, and only a few have studied the dynamics of the transmission of 
shocks involving developing economies.  
As  Agenor  et  al.  (2000)  noted  there  are  two  primary  reasons  for  this lack  of 
interest.  First,  the  limitations  on  the  quality  and  frequency  of  data  are  constraining 
factors. Dependable quarterly data on national accounts are available only for a handful 
of  developing  countries  and  even  when  they  are  available,  the  quality  of  the  data  is 
usually  lower  than  that  of  annual  data.  Second,  since  developing  countries  usually 
experience many unanticipated crises, it is hard to extract economic regularities in the 
data  that  are  usually  driven  by  the  crisis  environment.  Moreover,  these  crises  in 
developing countries are usually followed by radical reforms, causing significant policy 
changes  and  possible  structural  breaks  in  the  data.  This  makes  it  even  harder  to  use 
macroeconomics  data  to  look  for  regularities.  India  is  a  good  case  in  point.  India 
experienced a severe macroeconomic crisis in 1991, which initiated a series of reforms. 
These reforms have made drastic changes in the Indian economy especially in the 1990s. 
It is likely that these reforms and the relatively long period of adjustment will cause 
crucial  problems  in  utilizing  the  Indian  data  to  study  the  spatial  pattern  of 
macroeconomic  shocks  among  its  trading  partners.  Ghatak  (1997,  1998)  has  firmly 
established the importance of structural breaks in the case of India.    3 
In this study, we explore the feasibility of a rather unorthodox methodological 
approach. We use monthly real GDP forecasts of a developing country, India, and its 
major  trading  partners  during  1995-2002  to  study  the  nature  and  dynamics  of  the 
transmission of shocks. These forecasts are produced by experts from a mix of private 
consulting firms, public sector agencies, and university research bureaus specialized in a 
particular country. Using the econometric framework developed by Davies and Lahiri 
(1995, 1999) and Isiklar, Lahiri and Loungani (2006), we use successive differences in 
fixed-event  (rather  than  fixed-horizon)  forecasts  to  measure  the  aggregate  economic 
“news”  that  befell  in  a  particular  month.  The  advantage  of  this  measure  is  that  the 
estimated news based on forecasts is independent of actual GDP figures and is observed 
at monthly frequencies in real time. The actual GDP values are known to be sometimes 
notoriously  unreliable  due  to  successive  data  revisions.  Since  we  have  access  to 
simultaneous forecasts for a large number of countries, we can study the persistence, 
causality, and spatial transmission of such news in a cross-country context.  
It is well known that forecasts from estimated time series models often do not 
have  good  track  record  due  to  model  instability  and  structural  breaks.  The  forecasts 
generated by experts tend to respond the current economic news better. However, the 
idea of using forecast data to extract information regarding actual economic fundamentals 
is  still  subject  to  several  concerns,  and  the  use  of  survey  forecasts  necessitates  an 
examination  of  how  good  these  forecasts  are.  Thus,  we  first  measure  the  degree  of 
inefficiency in the Indian real GDP growth forecasts. While it is common to test for the 
rationality  of  the  forecasts  for  industrialized  countries,  it  is  not  so  for  developing 
countries. Hence our measurement of forecast inefficiency for India can be considered as 
another contribution of this study.
1 
Our measure of forecast efficiency is partly motivated by the recent interest in the 
measures of stickiness in information usage. Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2003), hereafter 
MR, have proposed a “sticky-information” model as an alternative to the classical sticky-
                                                            
1 As it will be clear later, for our purpose, we do not need the forecasts to be rational in the sense of Muth 
(1961); instead, we require a much less stringent condition that the forecasters eventually use all available 
information. More specifically, the agents may be inefficient (and biased) in absorbing the impact of shocks 
in their forecasts immediately, but under the condition that they adjust eventually, we show that the forecast   4 
price model. Sticky-information model of MR assumes that economic agents update their 
expectations only periodically because of costs of collecting and processing information.
2 
One implication of such a model is that the average forecast of individuals should follow 
a smooth path. While this smoothing behavior is well documented
3, not much attention 
has been given to the extent of it.  Mankiw et al. (2003) has measured the degree of news 
utilization in professional forecasts by imposing a structure on the true data generating 
process. In this study, we also measure the promptness in the utilization of information on 
Indian real GDP growth forecasts. The difference from Mankiw et al. (2003) is that their 
estimate  of  stickiness  is  based  on  particular  assumptions  about  the  data  generating 
process  of  the  actual  process  and  the  forecasters’  behavior  (i.e.  sticky-information 
model). On the other hand, our estimates use only the forecast data without imposing any 
structure  on  the  true  nature  of  the  data  generating  process  or  on  the  behavior  of  the 
forecasters.  
Using  a VAR model of forecast revisions, we  measure the degree of  forecast 
inefficiency in Indian real GDP forecasts. Our measure of inefficiency focuses on how 
quickly  agents  update  their  forecasts,  and  is  based  on  impulse  responses  and 
‘intertemporal variance decompositions’. These variance decompositions are similar to 
the classical variance decompositions but they  are not calculated across variables but 
calculated over time to measure the variance contribution in forecast revisions as time 
passes.  
After  establishing  the  extent  of  inefficiency  in  Indian  real  GDP  forecasts,  we 
compute  the  ‘total  utilization  of  news’  at  successive  months  after  controlling  for  the 
stickiness of the forecasters. Under the assumption that the forecasters eventually respond 
to  the  news  given  a  sufficient  length  of  time  (a  concept  that  we  call  “long-run 
efficiency”), we show that the steady-state variance decompositions that are based on 
cumulative impulse responses give the average variance decompositions of the actual real 
GDP growth.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
data can be fruitfully used for extracting information about the underlying economic structure.  
2 Sims (2003) has proposed an alternative model of inefficiency that is based on the assumption of limited 
processing power of agents.  
3 Studies that point out the smoothness are Nordhaus (1987), Clements (1999), and Harvey et al. (2003).   5 
We use two different types of VAR models in this paper. Initially we assume that 
the transmission of shocks across countries is dominated by foreign country shocks but 
not by common international shocks. Such a framework implies a classical VAR analysis 
without any common factors. Secondly, we study whether common international shocks 
play  an  important  role  in  the  transmission  of  shocks  across  countries  using  a  factor 
structural VAR (FSVAR) framework.  
Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, we find that Indian real 
GDP forecasts are efficient with respect to the use of information available domestically 
but not so with respect to foreign countries and/or common international information. It 
takes  almost  4  months  for  foreign  “news”  to  be  incorporated  in  the  forecasts. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the Indian forecasts compares very favorably with those of 
the major industrialized countries. Second, we find that there were two global factors that 
were important to India during 1995-2003 – one representing US, UK, EU-3 (Germany, 
Italy, France), and the other representing selected countries in North East and South East 
Asia. Further, the  Indian real GDP growth was mainly driven by the  Asian common 
factor and to a much lesser extent by Western common factor. On average more than 30 
percent of the Indian real GDP growth variance was accounted for by the common Asian 
cycle.  The  domestic  shocks  accounted  for  approximately  40  percent  of  the  variance. 
However, when we excluded the Asian crisis period (1997.7 - 1998.12) from the sample 
we found that the share of the domestic shocks increased to 60 percent and both Western 
and the Asian common shocks account for 16 percent each. Thus, we find that the spatial 
nature of the transmission mechanism can change within short periods of time  
2  Consensus Forecasts: Data and Characteristics 
Since October 1989, Consensus Economics Inc.
4 has been polling more than 600 
private market and other economists each month to obtain their forecasts. These surveys 
cover  estimates  for  the  principal  macroeconomic  variables  (including  GDP  growth, 
inflation,  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates)  of  over  70  countries.  The  forecasts  are 
compiled  into  a  series  of  publications,  Consensus  Forecasts  (includes  industrialized 
countries  and  published  monthly  since  1989),  Latin  American  Consensus  Forecasts   6 
(published bi-monthly since 1993), Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts (published monthly 
since  1995),  and  Eastern  Europe  Consensus  Forecasts  (published  bi-monthly  since 
1998). The numbers of panelists ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the countries, and for 
major countries the panelists are mostly based in countries they forecast. A sample of 
forecasters that reports for India is provided in Table 1. As it is seen in the table while 
some of the forecasters are located in India, others are multinational firms located in 
leading industrialized countries. Thus, these forecasts reflect widely diverse information 
sets held by different stakeholders of India.    
Even  though  Consensus  Forecasts  data  set  is  a  source  of  rich  economic 
information, there are only a handful of studies that have used this data. These are Artis 
(1997),  Batchelor  (2007),  Gallo,  Granger  and  Joen  (2002),  Harvey  et  al.  (2001), 
Loungani (2001), Juhn and Loungani (2002), Gultekin et al. (2006) and Gultekin and 
Lahiri  (2007).  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  Asia  Pacific  Consensus  Forecasts 
including those for India remain largely unused. 
In this article we will concentrate on the consensus forecasts of annual average 
real  GDP  growth.  A  consensus  forecast  is  a  simple  arithmetic  average  of  all  of  the 
individual predictions. Although for most of the countries the forecasts are for calendar 
years, for some countries including India fiscal year is used, (April to March). The rolling 
forecasts first made 24 months ahead for target years 1995 through 2003 are plotted in 
Figure  1.  The  actual  real  GDP  figures  are  given  on  the  right  side  of  the  diagram  at 
horizon 0.
5 These graphs reveal that the monthly forecasts are highly variable that can 
only be explained by real time news that fell during the preceding months. The graphs 
also reveal that the consensus forecasts made even one month before the end of the year 
can sometimes be significantly different form the actual real GDP values (e.g., forecast 
made in March 1998 for the FY 1998 is almost one percentage point below the actual).
6 
Apart from pure unanticipated forecasting error, this discrepancy can also be due to the 
fact that sometimes the revised GDP figures can be substantially different from the initial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Web: http://www.consensuseconomics.com 
5 These are the latest revisions released in June by Central Statistical Organizations for each year.   
6 This point has been documented by Gallo et al. (2002) for GDP forecasts of three developed countries.    7 
announcements. For other years the last forecasts were fairly close. As mentioned before, 
one advantage of our approach is that it does not depend on the actual GDP values.  
The  monthly  forecast  revisions  are  defined  as  news  as  perceived  by  the 
forecasters in real-time, and since forecasts are made for the current year and the next 
year, we can define two monthly news components with respect to these two target years. 
They are plotted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, and show very similar patterns. It should be 
emphasized that these series are generated in real time, and are not created at the end of 
the sample period, see Croushore and Stark (2001). Any student of the Indian economy 
can easily identify the up and down swings in these graphs. The bullish July 1999 – June 
2000 period reflects the optimism surrounding the newly elected BJP government at the 
Center, its proposed free-market reforms, and the surging stock market. However, the 
continuing  budget  deficits,  the  disappointing  Central  budget  of  March  2000,  looming 
inflation  fear,  etc.  were  creating  variability  in  the  forecasts.    During  August  2000- 
January 2002, the Indian economy experienced a series of bad economic news for real 
GDP growth. This is a period that can be identified as having bad balance of payments 
situation, soaring oil prices, stalled privatization programs, the earthquake of January 
2001,  arms  bribery  scandal,  recession  in  the  world  economy,  the  Enron  scandal, 
instability at the Center, the 9/11 attack, and others. However, with the revival of the 
world economy, and a good monsoon, the Indian economy seemed to have come out of 
its  slump  beginning  January  2002.  The  Gujrat  riots,  attacks  on  Kashmir,  and  poor 
monsoon of 2002 made growth prospects during this period uncertain.    
3  Measuring the Degree of Forecast Inefficiency 
In  this  study  we  propose  a  measure  of  forecast  inefficiency  which  is  not 
dependent on any assumed model.
7 The “sticky-information” model of MR assumes that 
economic  agents  update  their  expectations  only  periodically  because  of  costs  of 
collecting  and  processing  information,  and  this  causes  stickiness  in  aggregate 
expectations.  They  assume  that  in  any  given  period  each  individual  faces  a  constant 
                                                            
7 In recent years, a number of authors have given alternative behavioral and institutional explanations for 
the observed lack of rationality in survey forecasts. See, for instance, Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996), Laster 
et al. (1999), Mankiw and Reis (2001), and Sims (2003).   8 
probability  l  of  updating  their  information  set  and  therefore  only  a  fraction  of  the 
population  updates  their  forecasts  on  the  current  state  of  the  economy  and  computes 
optimal prices based on that information. The rest of the population continues to set 
prices on old plans and outdated information. Based on sticky-information model of MR, 
several studies have estimated the extent of stickiness. Khan and Zhu (2006) use VAR 
estimates to mimic the price expectations and find that stickiness for US and Canada is 
less than the stickiness for the UK. Carroll (2003) uses Michigan Survey of Consumers 
and measures the stickiness in information for households. They treat the forecasts from 
Survey  of  Professional  Forecasters  (SPF)  as  those  of  experts  and  then  measure  how 
quickly  the  households  utilize the  information  in  the  expert  forecasts.  They  find  that 
about at any point of time, 32 percent of households have inflation expectations that are 
more than a year out of date.  
The  model  of  expectations  proposed  by  MR  can  be  applied  to  professional 
forecasters’ expectations of other macroeconomic variables too. While sticky information 
explanation  is  not  originally  developed  for  professional  forecasters  who  have  strong 
incentives  to  update  their  information  frequently,  there  may  be  other  reasons  for  the 
professional forecasters to update their forecasts with a lag. For example, Sims (2003) 
points out that the agents may have information processing constraints, which may cause 
stickiness in information utilization. Also it has been pointed out by several studies that 
forecasters may avoid changing their predictions and smooth their forecasts in order to 
maintain  credibility.  For  example,  this  is  consistent  with  rational  bias  and  reputation 
effects as put forward Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) and Laster et al. (1999).  
As  we  know,  the  only  study  that  measures  the  degree  of  smoothness  for  the 
profession forecasters is Mankiw et al. (2003), where they measure it in an indirect way. 
They  use  a  VAR  over  the  whole  sample  to  model  how  rational  agents  form  their 
expectations  and  then  compare  these  rational  expectations  with  those  of  professional 
forecasters reported in Livingston survey assuming that their sticky-information model is 
correct. They find that the professional economists surveyed by the Livingston survey 
update their inflation expectations about every 10 months on average. Note that their 
estimate of stickiness depends on two assumptions. First the data generating process (i.e.   9 
VAR model) should be valid over the whole sample to generate rational expectations in 
real time. Second, the behavioral assumption about the forecasters, i.e. the assumption 
that  forecasters  have  sticky-information,  should  be  valid.  In  this  study  we  follow  a 
different  approach.  If  the  forecasts  are  smooth  for  any  reason  (sticky-information, 
rational inattention, reputation, rational bias, etc.), then this smoothness can be captured 
by focusing on the forecast revisions in repeated forecasts for the same target. In the next 
section we will estimate a VAR model on forecast revisions to capture the degree of 
inefficiency in a multivariate context without assuming the form inefficiency. 
3.1  VAR model 
In order to measure the stickiness in the forecasts we focus on the process of the 
forecast revisions.
 8 Generally speaking, today’s forecast revision may be interpreted as 
accumulation of past news components so that 
, , 0 , , 1 , , 1 2 , , 2 3 , , 3 i t h i t h i t h i t h i t h r b e b e b e b e + + + = + + + +K        (1) 
where  , , i t h r  represents the forecast revision in country i real GDP forecasts for year t 
when the forecast horizon is h,  s b  represents the usage of the new information that has 
been available s periods ago ( , , i t h s e + ). If, for example, the forecasters are fully efficient, 
then  0 j b =  for all j>0 should be satisfied. That is, all the information that becomes 
available should be immediately and no information components should be leftover to be 
utilized in later revisions.   
It  is  well  known  that  the  propagation  of  shocks  from  other  countries  is  an 
important source of GDP shocks to a country. Since forecast revisions indicate the impact 
of new information on GDP growth, using other countries’ forecast revisions in a VAR 
model provides a way for incorporating the cross-country information for testing and 
                                                            
8 Before measuring the degree of inefficiency in the forecasts we first tested for the forecast efficiency 
following Nordhaus (1987). Using a GMM framework similar to Davies and Lahiri (1995) we found that 
the Indian real GDP growth forecasts are inefficient. Note that the validity of rational expectations has 
important bearing on tests for Ricardian equivalence, permanent income/consumption hypothesis, etc.  See 
Ghatak and Ghatak (1996) for a serious attempt to grapple with this issue using Indian data.    10 
measuring inefficiency. If we use the forecast revisions of other countries in addition to 
the own country forecast revisions in a VAR model for J countries, we get 
  , 1 , 1 2 , 2 , , t h t h t h p t h p t h r c B r B r B r e + + + = + + + + + L         (2) 
where  rt,h  denote  a  (J  ×  1)  vector  containing  the  forecast  revisions  of  the  relevant 
countries  when  the  forecast  horizon  is  h  and  target  year  is  t  and  , , ( ) t h t h E e e¢ = W 
{ , , 1,2,..., } ij i j n s = = . Bk denote the (J × J) matrix of coefficients of rt,h+k. VAR (p) may 
be rewritten in VMA (¥) form, which is multivariate version of equation (1) as 
, 0 , 1 , 1 2 , 2 . t h t h t h t h r M M M m e e e + + = + + + +L           (3) 
where we usually assume that  0 M I =  for normalization.  
Notice that if the forecasters are efficient then they will be updating their forecasts 
exactly in the amount that the new information changes their rational expectations: 
, , , 1 ( | ) ( | ) t h t t h t t h r E y E y + = F - F  
where  , t h F   denote  the  information  set  when  the  forecast  horizon  is  h.  In  this  setup 
, , 1 ( | ) ( | ) t t h t t h E y E y + F - F  denote the new information on  t y  and it can be thought as the 
, t h e   in  equation  (3)  where  due  to  perfect  efficiency  we  will  have  0 k M =   for  0 k >  
, , t h t h r e = . 
Note  that  since  , t h i e +   is  assumed  to  be  the  information  that  arrives  between  forecast 
horizons h+i and h+i+1, i.e.  ( ) ( ) , , , 1 | | t h i t t h i t t h i E y E y e + + + + = F - F  for  0 i ³ , the process 
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  The estimated VAR system presents us with an important tool to understand the 
dynamics of the forecasting process in more detail than simple correlations. In its usual 
interpretation, impulse responses trace the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one 
of the innovations on the future values of other variables in the system. Our variables are 
forecast revisions of the sample countries; hence impulse responses show the responses 
of  forecast  revisions  to  innovations  over  time.  But  under  perfect  efficiency,  forecast 
revisions should respond fully to the shocks immediately. If the forecast revisions do not 
respond  to  the  shocks  immediately,  i.e.  if  there  are  nonzero  impulse  response  values 
when impulse response horizon is greater than zero, then forecasts are not efficiently 
using the information immediately, and some of the information is being utilized in the 
later forecast revisions. In other words, impulse responses of the forecast revisions show 
the dynamics of how shocks are absorbed in the forecast revisions over time. The longer 
it takes for the responses to go to zero, the greater is the degree of forecast inefficiency. 
Since  the  shocks  of  the  countries  are  correlated,  we  should  decompose  the 
correlated shocks into uncorrelated idiosyncratic shocks to find some economically useful 
representation  of  the  model.  The  classical  way  of  doing  this  is  by  using  Cholesky 
decomposition.  The  Cholesky  decomposition  imposes  a  recursive  structure  on  the 
contemporaneous interactions among the variables and the resulting impulse response 
functions become dependent on the ordering of the variables in the VAR. But such a 
recursive structure is arbitrary and can be very restrictive. To guard against this criticism, 
we use ordering-free generalized VAR model that was introduced by Koop, Pesaran and 
Potter (1996) for nonlinear systems. Pesaran and Shin (1998) proposed the method for an 
ordering free solution in the VAR analysis and they show that  1 n´  vector of k period 
ahead generalized impulse response of the effect of a one-standard deviation shock in the 
j
th country forecast revision equation is given by:   12 
1 2 ( ) j jj k j k M e y s
- = W                 (5) 
where ej is the j
th column of an identity matrix.  
The  impulse  responses  provide  one  way  of  judging  the  speed  with  which 
individual country information gets absorbed into forecasts, but it is not an aggregate 
measure.  To  look  at  an  aggregate  measure  of  inefficiency  we  need  to  focus  on  the 
variance  decompositions  aggregated  over  all  countries.  The  classical  variance 
decompositions give us estimates of the relative importance of domestic vis-à-vis foreign 
shocks in explaining forecast revision variance in the long run. But another important 
issue is the speed of forecasters’ response to news over time.  
In order to do this, we need to see how much of the variation in forecast revisions 
is accounted for by current innovations and how much of it is accounted for by past 
innovations. Thus, we decompose the variation in forecast revisions over time into its 
new and old components using cumulative ‘intertemporal variance decompositions’. For 
country i, the cumulative percentage of the variation of the revisions due to information 
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where ei is the i
th column of an identity matrix, see Isiklar et al. (2006).  
While  the  intertemporal  variance  decompositions  in  equation  (6)  give  an 
aggregate measure for the degree of inefficiency, one may also examine the inefficiency 
specifically towards foreign or common shocks. We will answer this question using a 
factor structural VAR model. We discuss this model in the next section.    13 
3.2  Factor Structural VAR model 
In  the  previous  section,  we  assume  that  domestic  and  foreign  idiosyncratic 
country shocks are the most relevant information source for the real GDP figures. In this 
section we include common international factors in our model using a factor structural 
VAR (FSVAR) model. FSVAR models have increasingly become popular in studying the 
international  propagation  of  shocks.  Recently  Clark  and  Shin  (2000),  and  Stock  and 
Watson  (2005)  used  these  models  to  shed  some  light  on  the  sources  of  economic 
fluctuations. The FSVAR model can be thought of a structural VAR model. In a FSVAR 
model, it is assumed that the contemporaneous interaction among variables stem from the 
common shocks. In other words, idiosyncratic country shocks are assumed to have no 
effect on other countries contemporaneously. Then, the reduced form errors follow the 
structure: 
, , , t h t h t h f Au e = L +                 (7) 
where  , t h f   is  1 k ´   vector  that  denote  the  common  international  factors 
with , , ( ) t h t h E f f I ¢ = , L is the  J k ´  matrix of factor loadings, A is a  J J ´  matrix of the 
contemporaneous  spillovers  across  countries,  and  , t h u   is  a  1 J ´   vector  of  the 
idiosyncratic country shocks with 
2 2
, , 1 ( ) ( ,..., ) t h t h u uJ E u u diag s s ¢ = =D. In the special case 
with A I = ,  contemporaneous  interactions  across  countries  through  the  errors  are  not 
permitted. This special case is the model that is also estimated by Stock and Watson 
(2005) and will be the main workhorse in this study as well. While assuming that the 
contemporaneous interaction terms across countries are due to the common shocks and 
none are due to spillovers (i.e., transmission of idiosyncratic country shocks) is quite 
restrictive, we do not have much choice because of identification problems.
9 So assuming 
that A I = ,  our  aim  becomes  to  estimate  L  and  D.  Once  they  are  estimated  we  can 
rewrite the vector moving average model in the form: 
                                                            
9 Later, we will experiment with some alternative specifications for the A matrix by letting some off-
diagonal elements to be non-zeros. Note that spillovers in this model take place via the lagged terms of the 
VAR model. With monthly data, this assumption is less restrictive than with quarterly data, cf. Stock and 
Watson (2005).   14 
, , , 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 2 , 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) . t h t h t h t h t h t h t h r f u M f u M f u m + + + + = + L + + L + + L + +L     (8) 
this can be used to compute impulse responses and variance decompositions. So with 
J=7, reduced-form errors will be decomposed into k+ 7 shocks where k is the number of 
international common factors.  
Once the FSVAR model is estimated intertemporal variance decompositions can 
be constructed in a similar way as (6). Also we can construct intertemporal variance 
decompositions for the utilization of domestic shocks, common shocks or foreign shocks 
as well. For example, equation (9) gives the cumulative percentage of the variation in the 
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The other intertemporal variance decompositions can be constructed in a similar fashion. 
Note that in our context FSVAR model is useful for two reasons. First, in recent 
yeas  many  studies  have  emphasized  the  importance  of  common  factors  in  the 
international business cycle propagation, and it would be interesting to explore the impact 
of common shocks on individual country GDP growth rates and their forecasts. This will 
be discussed in the next section in detail. Second, a common factor model provides a 
natural  way  how  forecasters  form  their  expectations  based  on  the  rational  inattention 
model of Sims (2003). Following his approach, let us suppose that the forecasters have 
information  processing  limitations.  In  this  case,  initially  they  would  allocate  their 
resources to the most  relevant information sources and ignore the less  relevant ones. 
Clearly, in such a case domestic news is the first to be utilized since usually it is cheap 
and relevant. After absorbing the domestic news, it is likely that forecasters will next pay 
attention to the common international shocks. This is because common international news 
is  more  accessible  and  is  easier  to  observe  than  the  news  coming  from  individual   15 
countries separately. For example, a forecaster in India may not pay enough attention to 
announcements of employment figures for all of its trading countries. But it may be easy 
to observe global news and common international shocks such as wars, oil price shocks, 
Asian  crises  or  technological  innovations.  Hence  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
forecasters react to the domestic shocks along with the common international shocks but 
ignore  the  idiosyncratic  foreign  country  shocks  contemporaneously.  Notice  that  one 
possible problem with this approach is that we may overestimate the impact of common 
international  shocks  because  we  assume  that  contemporaneous  interaction  among  the 
forecast revisions occur due to the common international shocks. See footnote 9.  
4  International Transmission of Shocks 
4.1  The Literature 
Interest in international  transmission of shocks  has been  growing in the last few 
years, see for example, McAdam (2003), Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Cardarelli and 
Kose (2004), Monfort et al. (2003), Stock and Watson (2005), Ahmed (2003), and Smets 
and Wouters (2005). These studies usually utilize quarterly or annual GDP data as a 
measure of economy’s overall activity and used a sampling period starting from post 
WWII period to the present. For example, Smets and Wouters (2005) use real GDP data 
along with six other macroeconomic data - consumption, investment, prices, real wages, 
employment and the nominal interest rate - over a sample period from 1947 to 2002 and 
over a shorter period from 1983 to 2002. Stock and Watson (2005) use real GDP data 
from G7 countries and estimate an FSVAR model over 1960-1983 and 1984-2001. Since 
the low degrees of freedom in the unrestricted VAR model would create a considerable 
sampling uncertainty, Stock and Watson (2005) employed a restricted VAR model in the 
sense that they used only a single lag for the foreign GDP growth but they use four lags 
for the own country GDP growth. Monfort et al. (2003) use quarterly GDP figures in 
addition to monthly industrial production data for the G7 countries from 1970 to 2002. 
Industrial  production,  though  available  monthly,  is  less  suitable  compared  to  GDP 
because it covers only a small part of the economy, see footnote 13.    16 
The GDP, which is the best indicator for the overall economic activity, is available 
only  quarterly  with  substantial  lag  and  revisions.  This  implies  that  the  studies  on 
international transmission of shocks, where the GDP interactions are usually measured 
among several countries in a multivariate model like VAR, do not have enough degrees 
of  freedom.  The  situation  is  much  worse  for  the  developing  countries,  where  the 
availability of data constrains the study even more. Because of this limitation only a 
limited  number  papers  study  the  transmission  of  shocks  in  developing  countries,  see 
Agenor et al. (2000), Kim et al. (2003), and Selover (1999). In addition to the limited 
data,  developing  countries  also  suffer  from  the  frequent  crisis  and  structural  breaks, 
which make the study  of transmission of shocks even more difficult.  Use of dummy 
variables is a common but not an ultimate solution to control for the impact of frequent 
crises; the meaning of the dummy variables is not clear in most of the cases and their use 
decreases the degrees of freedom even more. For example, Selover (1999) studies the 
transmission of business cycles in the ASEAN region using annual data between 1961 
and 1997. Selover (1999) computes bivariate VAR models due to the restrictions on the 
degrees of freedom, and fails to find a significant transmission of business cycles among 
the  ASEAN  countries.  Among  several  other  explanations,  he  notes  that  the  low 
significance level can be due to i) small sample size; or ii) large domestic shocks such as 
wars, coups, natural disasters, insurrections, gross economic policy errors, bad harvests, 
and commodity price volatility which can add noise to the estimates. In order to correct 
for these large domestic shocks, he uses a set of level dummies and commodity prices as 
additional explanatory variables. However, the addition of these explanatory variables 
decreases  the  degrees  of  freedom  and  increases  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
estimates.
10  Moreover,  in  short  samples,  the  usage  of  dummy  variables  can  be 
treacherous and it is possible that the results are highly dependent on the specification 
and selection of these dummies. If there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and shape 
of the structural breaks, a better method may be focusing in sub samples.  
                                                            
10 For example, in his VAR(2) model of Thailand, the number of right-hand side variables is 14 due to the 
presence of  lagged terms, dummy variables and commodity prices. Since Selover (1999) has 35 usable 
observations (1963-1997), the degree of freedom becomes only 21.   17 
4.2  India During 1990s 
India’s situation is a perfect example to show the extent of the problem of such a 
structural  break.  In  1991,  severe  macroeconomic  and  the  balance  of  payments  crisis 
initiated a set of reforms including devaluation of rupee and liberalization of international 
trade and foreign investment in India. While in the pre-1991 period, India was largely 
insulated from the world, in the post 1991 period she started to connect with the world 
more  than  ever  following  the  radical  reforms  in  every  aspect  of  the  economic  life.
11 
These reforms resulted in significant changes in the macroeconomic variables in the early 
1990s, especially between 1991 and 1996.
12 These changes suggest that in 1991 India 
started to experience a structural change and was in a transition period until 1995-1996. 
This structural break and the long transition period clearly complicate the analysis of 
international transmission of shocks for India causing lack of usable GDP data to study 
the sources of GDP variations in the long haul.
13 
Because of these restrictions in Indian data, we do not use the actual GDP figures but 
use the monthly forecasts of it and investigate whether the cross-country forecast data can 
be used to study the transmission of shocks between India and its major trading partners. 
Use of forecast data offers several advantages. First of all, the sample size is no longer a 
problem  since  the  forecasters  report  two  forecasts  (for  current  and  next  year)  every 
                                                            
11 For example, the rupee was devalued by 22.8 percent relative to a basket of currencies in 1991 and was 
made convertible in 1993. The import-weighted average tariff for the whole economy was brought down to 
33 percent in 1994-1995 from 87 percent in 1990-1991 and remained relatively stable since then. In 1991, 
many restrictions on the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) were removed although FDI is still 
prohibited in certain sectors of the economy such as retail trade. See Srinivasan (2001) for a detailed 
analysis of the reforms that took place in India during the post 1991 period, and Ghatak and Halicioglu 
(2007) for the role of FDI in the transmission mechanism. 
12 For example, both the exports and imports started to grow as large as 20 percent in the early 1990s until 
1995-1996. Since 1996, the growth rates of exports and imports have been mostly less than 10 percent. 
Similarly, the share of exports plus imports as a percent of GDP increased from 14.4 percent in 1991-1992 
to 21.6 percent in 1995-1996 and remained stable since then. Liberalization of FDI policy and reforms 
boosted the FDI inflows in India in early 1990s until 1996. In 1991 FDI inflows to India were only US$155 
million. During 1991-1995 period inflows approximately doubled in every year reaching US$2.1 billion in 
1995. Based on the World Investment Reports of UNCTAD, since 1995 FDI inflows has grown relatively 
slow reaching US$3.4 billion in 2001 and stayed the same in 2002. 
13 An alternative approach would be to use some monthly data such as industrial production. However, the 
differences in the growth rates of industry, service and agriculture sector and the increasing share of the 
service sector in the economy causes a problem in using industrial production data. For example, as it is 
analyzed in detail by Gordon and Gupta (2003), over 1991-2000, the service sector grew by 7.5 percent, 
while the industry sector grew by 5.8 and agriculture sector by only 3.1 percent resulting in an average 
GDP growth of 5.8 percent.   18 
month. Secondly, the number of lags required in VAR model on forecast revisions is 
expected to be much smaller than the number of lags required when we use actual GDP 
figures. This is because forecasters adjust their forecasts by the amount of the change in 
their expectations immediately after they observe a shock and they do not wait for the 
shock’s impact to be realized. Under rationality, the lag length is actually zero.  Thirdly, 
due  our  data  frequency  we  can  study  the  transmission  mechanism  over  a  very  short 
period with relatively large sample size. For example, in section 6 we will work on the 
post 1995 period without using the Asian crisis period to isolate the impact of Asian 
crisis on the transmission of shocks.  
Clearly,  there  is  a  disadvantage  of  using  forecast  data  too.  Especially  if  the 
forecasters are biased and inefficient, the results arrived by using forecast data may be 
highly misleading. But note that the most important factor in the reliability in the results 
is not that the forecasters are biased or inefficient in the short-run but rather their ability 
of correcting their mistakes in the long-run. Under the assumption that the forecasters can 
correct  their  previous  misjudgments  on  the  economic  activity,  we  provide  a  simple 
method to adjust for the inefficiencies in the forecasts and use the forecast data to study 
the  sources  of  GDP  variations  for  a  country.
14  In  the  following  two  sub-sections  we 
consider the cases when the forecasts are efficient and when they are inefficient. 
4.3  Estimating the Structure of Transmission of Shocks Using Forecast Data 
1.1.1.  Under Perfect Efficiency 
As noted earlier under perfect efficiency we have,  
, , , 1 ( | ) ( | ) t h t t h t t h r E y E y + = F - F  
                                                            
14  Our  cross-country  forecast  data  can  be  used  to  understand  how  expectations  are  changing  and  get 
affected by changes in expectations of other countries. Such information may be important, for example, to 
understand the reasons behind Asian financial crisis. One argument as to why the Asian crisis occurred is 
that the agents had overly optimistic GDP growth expectations before the crisis, which caused them to save 
less but consume and invest  more than optimum, and financed by large capital inflows. But  when an 
external shock led to a sudden change in the expectations, a rapid reversal of capital flows triggered a 
currency crash. Corsetti et al. (1999) offers a number of explanations for the Asian crisis. So in order to 
understand  the  importance  of  expectations  role  in  the  crisis,  it  would  be  interesting  to  study  how 
expectations reacted to shocks and how they propagated among the countries.   19 
In this case a factor structure or any other economically meaningful structure can be 
imposed on the forecast revision series. Suppose we believe that FSVAR structure given 
in (7) is valid. Then, we have  
, , , t h t h t h r f u = L +               (10) 
The estimates of  L can be obtained using static factor analysis methods. In this case, 
maximum  likelihood  estimates  would  be  based  on  the  variance  covariance  matrix 
constructed  using  the  forecast  revisions.  But  notice  that  since  we  assume  perfect 
efficiency and no contemporaneous response to foreign country shocks (spillovers) at the 
same time, this would imply that idiosyncratic country shocks do not propagate across 
countries at all. Then the estimate of L from equation (10) would give the average value 
of the impact of common factors on the real GDP growth rate.  
1.1.2.  Under Long-run Efficiency 
If the forecasts are inefficient to some degree and they do not include all the 
available information , t h F , then we should correct the inefficiency in the revisions to 
understand  the  transmission  of  shock  structure  across  countries  using  forecast  data. 
Suppose  that  the  forecast  revisions  follow  the  process  given  in  (3)  but  forecasters 
eventually  utilize  all  the  information  within  p  periods,  so  that  there  exists  p  such 
that 0 i M =  i p > . This implies that when there is sufficient number of forecast horizons, 
i.e.  whenh p ³ ,  there  should  be  enough  time  for  the  forecasters  to  utilize  all  the 
information before they are finished with forecasting for a target. That is, the impact of 
news  , t h e  will be reflected in the forecasts by the time they report their forecast , t h p f - . 
But,  in  this  case,  the  total  amount  of  utilized  news  will  be  nothing  but 
0 1 2 ... M M M + + + .,  which  is  the  accumulated  impulse  response  function.  Then 
accumulated  impulse  responses  give  the  total  utilization  of  the  information  not  only 
included in the first forecast just after  , t h e  is observed, i.e.  , t h f , but also news utilized in   20 
the later forecasts too, i.e.  , 1 , 2 , , ,..., t h t h t h p f f f - - - . More formally when forecast horizon is h-
p the total utilization of news  , t h e  is given by
15  
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where (i,j)
th element of  e G  gives the total utilization of j
th element of  , t h e  on variable i. 
Another way of looking at this aggregated measure is “inefficiency adjusted utilization of 
news”. While  r M  denote the inefficient response of the forecasters,  0
p
r r M = S  gives the 
inefficiency adjusted response. This suggests that if we assume that forecasters eventually 
use all the available information, cumulative impulse responses from the FSVAR model 
will  equal  the  impact  of  the  shocks  on  the  actual  real  GDP  growth  averaged  over 
horizons.  Moreover,  steady-state  variance  decompositions  that  are  based  on  these 
cumulative impulse responses will give the share of shocks accounted for by common 
factors and idiosyncratic country shocks.  
We  can  also  calculate  the  total  utilization  of  common  factors  and  individual 
country specific news using equation (8). For example from equation (8), it is clear that 
the total utilization of news in the common factors  , t h f  is represented by 0
p
r r M = S L. Hence 
under  the  assumption  of  long-run  efficiency,  the  variation  accounted  for  by  the  j
th 
common factor in i
th country’s real GDP variations is 
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where  L %  and  M %  denote the inefficiency adjusted total utilization of news in common 
factors and individual country shocks respectively, that is, 
                                                            
15 Note that when there is not enough time, i.e., when h p £ , the full amount of the information will not 
be utilized in the forecasts; instead the total utilization of the news will be the sum of the moving average 
coefficients over the forecast horizon, i.e.  0 r r














=∑ % ,  
where, as defined earlier, D is the diagonal matrix that carries the idiosyncratic country 
variances,  ( ) ( )
2 2
, , 1 ,..., t h t h u uJ D E u u diag s s ¢ = = . Notice that in equation (11), ( )
2
i j e e L %  is 
the  contribution  of  j
th  common  factor  shocks,  and  ( )
2
i s e Me %   is  the  contribution of  s
th 
country  shock  to  the  variation  in  total  news  utilization  in  the  i
th  country’s  real  GDP 
growth forecasts. If our assumption that forecasters are long-run efficient in p periods is 
valid then the share in total news utilization should be related to the average variance 
decompositions that are based on actual real GDP growths.  
5  Empirical Results on the Degree of Forecast Efficiency 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics and Generalized VAR Results 
We measure the degree of inefficiency in the forecasts using a VAR model of four 
countries  and  three  country  blocks.  Since  our  analysis  also  examines  the  impact  of 
foreign country shocks on India, we should be careful about the calendar year and fiscal 
year differences. If the forecasts are for the calendar year, then survey respondents make 
their first forecasts when there are 24 months to the end of calendar year; that is, on 
January of the previous year they start forecasting, and their last forecast is reported at the 
beginning of December of the year they are forecasting. But this is different for India, 
where survey respondents make their first forecasts when there are 24 months to the end 
of fiscal year; that is, on April of the previous year they start forecasting, and their last 
forecast is reported at the beginning of March of the year they are forecasting. The first 
official announcement of the fiscal year GDP comes in early July, with an immediate 
revision in late July and a few revisions thereafter (see Sivasubramonium (2000)). 
Table 2 presents the relation between the calendar year and fiscal year forecasts. 
In each month forecasters report two forecasts: one for the current year and the other for   22 
the next year.  For example, on January 2000, a current calendar year forecast predicts the 
average GDP growth rate for year 2000. However, for India, the forecast that is reported 
on January 2000 is still aiming the current fiscal year, which is year 1999. This difference 
between the calendar and the fiscal year targets is true for February and March forecasts 
too. Since we will use these forecasts to analyze the causal relation between India and 
other  countries  the  forecasts  should  be  comparable  in  terms  of  timing.  That  is,  the 
forecasts should target the same year and also the forecast horizons should not be very 
different from each other. Notice that for the calendar year forecasts reported in January, 
February or March that target the next year, there is no contemporaneous match in the 
fiscal year forecasts.  Similarly, for the fiscal year forecasts in January, February and 
March  that  target  the  current  fiscal  year,  there  is  no  contemporaneous  match  in  the 
calendar year forecasts. So we had no choice but drop these observations from our data 
set in our VAR analysis. So we drop both the next year calendar forecasts when the 
forecast  horizon  is  more  than  21  and  the  current  year  fiscal  year  forecasts  when  the 
forecast horizon is less than 4. This means that forecast horizon for the calendar year 
forecasts range between 1 and 21 and for the fiscal year forecasts, forecast horizon range 
between 4 and 24. Thus, for each country and for a target year we have 21 forecasts. Our 
data set ranges from January 1995 (the first forecast for India in Consensus Economics, 
Inc. data base) to November 2002. In a VAR(1) model, the total number of observations 
per country is 148. 
Since our main purpose is to analyze the causality of shocks between India and its 
major  trading  partners,  we  choose  countries  and  regions  that  have  significant 
relationships with India. These are: USA, UK, the European block, Japan, Southeast Asia 
block, and Northeast Asia block. As reported by Dua and Banerji (2001), the export-
based shares of these countries add up to more than 60% of the total. Three largest trade 
partners of India from Europe, viz., Germany, France and Italy, make up the European 
block.  UK  is  treated  as  separate  from  the  European  block  because  of  its  historical 
relationship with India, and because it is well known that the British business cycles are   23 
quite  distinct  from  the  European  cycles  that  is  led  by  Germany.  The  Southeast  and 
Northeast Asian blocks are defined below (Table 3).
16 
The  Consensus  Economics  Inc.  reports  the  aggregate  measures  of  real  GDP 
growth rates for the two regions in Asia, North East Asia and South East Asia. It uses the 
1995 GDP shares for this aggregation. Since the weights are subject to change based on 
the actual data that is used, (i.e. which revision of the actual is used), we calculated the 
implied GDP shares by regressing the reported regional GDP growth forecasts on the 
individual  countries  GDP  forecasts.  Our  calculations  show  that  the  North  East  Asia 
region weights for China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan are 45%, 9%, 29.5% and 
16.5%  respectively.  Similarly,  for  South  East  Asia  region,  weights  for  Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  Singapore,  Thailand  and  Philippines  are  32.5%,  14%,  13.7%,  26.5%  and 
13.7% respectively. Note that the shares may not add up to 100% due to rounding. The 
countries and weights are summarized in Table 3. 
We estimated a 7-country VAR model with monthly data on forecast revisions 
over January 1995 – November 2002.
 We use Akaike and Schwarz information criteria to 
decide on the number of lags. The results for these information criteria along with some 
fitness statistics for the Indian equation are given in Table 4. As it is clear from the table 
the optimum lag length is 1 for our model. Note that the number of usable observations 
decreases quite rapidly with each additional lag. This is because our data is in the form of 
a panel data with 9 target years (from 1995 to 2003) and with each additional lag we lose 
9 observations.
17  
We  estimated  generalized  impulse  responses  and  presented  them  in  Figure  5. 
These impulse responses illustrate how quickly new information gets utilized in Indian 
                                                            
16 We also estimate the VAR model using six individual countries that have the largest trade with India. 
These are USA, UK, Japan, Germany (representative for European block) Singapore (representative for 
South East Asian block), and Hong Kong (representative for the North East Asian block). The results with 
individual seven countries as defined above were very similar to the main conclusions of this paper.  
17 Consider a VAR(3) model. After taking the first difference to calculate the forecast revisions, we are left 
with 20 observations per country per year. Due to the use of third lag, we have 17 observations per country 
per year. So from 1996 to 2001 we have 17 observations, for 1995 we have 8 observations (the first 
available forecast is January 1995), for 2002 we have 16 observations (since the latest available forecast is 
November  2002)  and  for  2003  we  have  4  observations.  So  in  total  we  have  17*6+8+16+4=130 
observations for each country. Similarly the VAR(1) model will have 148 observations.   24 
real GDP forecasts. The top chart in Figure 5 shows the utilization of domestic news. As 
shown in this chart, domestic shocks are being absorbed rather quickly in the forecasts. 
The rest of the charts in Figure 5 show the utilization of foreign country shocks. Notice 
that the scale of these graphs is different from the first one. Here we see that especially 
North East Asian and South East Asian shocks are absorbed at a much slower rate than 
the domestic shocks. Moreover, one can suggest from these graphs that Asian countries 
seem to have a greater impact on India than the Western countries. But we will discuss 
more about this issue later.  
The  impulse  responses  in  Figure  5  provide  inefficiency  measures  in  utilizing 
cross-country  information  but  they  do  not  provide  an  aggregate  measure  for  news 
utilization.  As  an  aggregate  measure,  we  construct  the  intertemporal  variance 
decompositions for India in Figure 6. From this graph it can be seen that 90 percent of 
revision variance are accounted for by the past two months’ shocks. This implies that 
Indian forecasters are using information quite efficiently on average and, though found 
inefficient by the Nordhaus test, the Indian forecasts seem to reflect new information 
quite promptly. Let us note that the aggregate news utilization curve as depicted in Figure 
6  is  robust  to  alternative  identification  schemes  (i.e.  ordering  of  the  variables, 
contemporaneous  restrictions,  etc.)  because  all  the  countries  have  been  aggregated  in 
these calculations.  
5.2  FSVAR results 
The estimation of FSVAR is similar to the estimation of any structural VAR with 
one  important  difference.  Instead  of  restrictions  on  the  contemporaneous  interaction 
among variables, or long-run restrictions, we assume that contemporaneous interactions 
among variables are due to common factors. This implies that the estimation is performed 
in two steps similar to Clark and Shin (2000). In the first step, VAR is estimated in the 
usual way. In the second step, we maximize the likelihood function to find the unknowns 
L  and  ui s s.  The  confidence  intervals  for  the  impulse  responses  and  variance 
decompositions are constructed by 500 bootstrap runs.   25 
In  order  to  estimate  the  FSVAR  model,  first  we  have  to  make  sure  that 
identification  conditions  are  satisfied  and  also  we  have  to  decide  on  the  number  of 
common factors in the model. The order condition implies that for exact identification of 
this  structural  VAR,  we  need  7x6/2=21  restrictions  and  we  can  estimate  7x8/2=28 
parameters (i.e. the number of single elements of the variance covariance matrixW). This 
implies that our FSVAR model is overidentified (in terms of the order condition) when 
3 k £ . In order to uniquely identify the factor loadings we need to normalize the effect of 
one of the common factors (when k=2) or two of the common factors (when k=3). For 
example when k=2, we set the impact of the second factor on US to zero. Then the total 
number of parameters to be estimated becomes (2*7-1)+7=20. Similarly, when k=3, we 
set the impact of the second and third factors on US, and the impact of third factor on 
Japan to zero.
18 Then the total number of parameters to be estimated becomes  (3*7-
3)+7=25. So the FSVAR structure imposes 28-(7.1)+7=14 restrictions when k=1, 28-
20=8 restrictions when k=2 and 28-25=3 restrictions when k=3.  
Using these restrictions, we tested the overidentifying restrictions and presented 
results in Table 5. The hypothesis of one common factor is strongly rejected while the 
hypothesis of 2 and 3 common factors are not rejected at the conventional significance 
levels. So we use an FSVAR model with two common factors.  
The  estimated  impulse  response  functions  to  the  domestic  shocks  and  two 
common factors are given in Figure 7. The first chart of Figure 7 shows the utilization of 
the  domestic  information  and  95%  confidence  intervals.  Similar  to  the  findings  with 
generalized impulse responses, we observe that impulse responses to domestic shocks go 
to  zero  almost  immediately.  The  second  and  the  third  charts  in  Figure  7  show  the 
utilization of the international common factors. As opposed to the quick utilization of the 
domestic information, we observe some stickiness in utilization of information in the 
common factor. Especially, the information related with second common factor is very 
slowly absorbed in the forecasts. As we will discuss later, this second common factor can 
                                                            
18 Note that while the interpretation of common factors change depending on which countries are used for 
normalization, the intertemporal variance decompositions and so the results of this study are not affected  
by the normalization scheme.   26 
be considered as the Asian common shock, which implies that Indian forecaster may 
increase their forecast efficiency by utilizing the Asia-related shocks more promptly. 
To construct an aggregate measure of inefficiency we calculated the intertemporal 
variance decompositions for Indian forecast revisions. Figure 8 presents the intertemporal 
variance decompositions calculated from the FSVAR (1) model. The figure clearly shows 
that more than 90 percent of the forecast revision variation is captured within 2 months 
the  information  becomes  available.  Also  notice  the  similarity  between  Figure  8  with 
Figure 6. If the model were exactly identified then the aggregate measure of inefficiency 
calculated in the previous section would be exactly same as the aggregate measure of the 
model calculated here. This is because  ˆ ˆˆ (1/ ) TH ee¢ S = W would be exactly satisfied for 
exactly identified systems. But since the model is over-identified, our constructed errors 
do not satisfy  ˆ ˆˆ (1/ ) TH ee¢ S = W exactly, and hence this aggregate measure of inefficiency 
could  be  different  from  the  previous  estimate.  This  implies  that  better  the  restriction 
imposed by equation (7) fits the model, the closer the two estimates of aggregate measure 
of inefficiency would be. So the similarity between Figure 8 and Figure 6 implies that the 
FSVAR  model  fits  the  data  well  and  this  can  be  taken  as  additional  support  for  the 
FSVAR specification. 
We compute the individual intertemporal variance decompositions, i.e. domestic, 
foreign countries and common factors. In order to be brief, we only present the most 
interesting results, which are the utilization of information in the common factors. The 
intertemporal variance decomposition for the combined common factors which is based 
on equation (9) is given in Figure 9. Similar to the findings in the impulse responses 
presented in Figure 7, we find that forecasters tend to under utilize news from common 
international factors initially. It takes up to 4 months to reach 90 percent threshold in 
terms of explaining the revision variance accounted for by the two international common 
factors.  
To  be  briefly  we  find  that  Indian  forecasts  are  not  efficient  in  the  sense  that 
forecast  revisions  are  serially  correlated  (e.g.,  Nordhaus  (1987))  but  the  degree  of 
inefficiency is quite low. As we have mentioned earlier several models may explain this   27 
observed inefficiency. The evidence of inefficiency may be due to sticky-information, 
rational inattention, credibility issues or rational bias. Another explanation may come 
from the inefficiency of the statistical agency processing the available information. Faust 
et al. (2005) found that the actual data revisions that are produced by statistical agencies 
of UK, Italy and Japan are highly predictable, but they are much less so for US. This 
implies that some part of the observed forecast inefficiency can be due to the inefficiency 
of the statistical agencies rather that of the forecasters.
19  
We should again point out that our methodology for testing for forecast efficiency 
and studying the causality of international shocks are independent of the actual values 
that are only subsequently observed. That is, we do not need the actual forecast errors in 
our analysis. Apart from the fact that forecast errors are observed much later than when 
forecasts are made, any analysis based on forecast errors (i.e., actual minus predicted) has 
very little value in real time. In addition, the forecast errors depend on data revisions, 
which are sometimes substantial. Not surprisingly, the Indian GDP figures go through 
substantial  data  revisions.  For  instance,  the  initial  June  value  of  the  year-over-year 
growth rate in real GDP for FY 2000 was revised from 6.0% in June 2001 to 4% in 
February 2002. Since 1995 such revisions have been nearly 0.5% on the average. 
6  Empirical Results on Transmission of Shocks as Implied by Forecast Data 
6.1  Under Perfect Efficiency - Static Factor Analysis 
Under the assumption that forecast data is efficient the cross-country correlations 
of forecast revisions show the importance of cross country linkages in monthly shocks. 
We provide these correlations in forecast revisions across seven selected countries and 
country groups in Table 6. As seen in this table, the correlations for India with USA, EU-
3 and UK are only around 0.12; the corresponding values for South East Asian region 
(0.39), Japan (0.31), and North East Asian region (0.38) are much higher. By contrast, the 
correlations between North East Asia region and South East Asia region, and between 
EU-3 and USA, EU-3 and the UK are in excess of 0.50. Note that these contemporaneous 
correlations  can  be  due  to  production,  consumption  and  FDI  interdependencies,  or 
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common exogenous shocks with out such interdependencies, see Canova and Marriman 
(1998) and Ghatak and Halicioglu (2007).  
To observe how these correlations change over our sample we constructed the 
correlations of the forecast revisions of the three countries and three country groups with 
respect to Indian forecast revisions over a rolling window of 36 observations. The results 
are presented in Figure 4. The first figure presents the correlations for Japan, South East 
Asia and North East Asia and the second figure presents the correlations for the US, the 
three countries of the European Union and the UK. On the horizontal axis we give the 
periods over which the correlations are calculated. Notice that 36 observations represent 
21 month period, this is because the forecasters report 2 forecasts each month, and also 
we drop three observations to match the fiscal year and calendar years. The correlations 
show that typically forecast revisions of the Asian countries have larger correlations with 
Indian forecast revisions than those of the US, the EU or the UK. Especially from 1997 to 
1998, a period that covers Asian crisis, the correlations with North East Asia and South 
East Asia increase over 0.60. Another interesting observation from the first figure is that 
the correlations of the Asian countries seem to be moving together, which may suggest an 
existence of a common Asian business cycle. Later, when we present our results of the 
FSVAR model, we will address this issue again and show that there is really somewhat 
strong common factor that affects the Asian countries. 
As discussed earlier, if we assume that the forecasts are efficient then static factor 
analysis  methods  provide  evidence  about  how  common  factors  impact  individual 
country’s real GDP growth. We use factor analysis to shed light on how the economies 
naturally group together in terms of the reaction to the common factors. Table 7 presents 
such factor loadings for the selected countries and country blocks estimated based on 
Equation (10). Identification problem can be solved in two different ways in the static 
factor analysis. One way is to impose a normalization pattern on the estimated factor 
loadings as we discuss earlier. Second approach is applying an orthogonal transformation 
on the estimated factor  loadings.  In Table 7, we used Varimax transformation to get 
meaningful estimates for the factor loadings. We report the results for two and three 
                                                                                                                                                                             
component, see Faust et al. (2005) and Mankiw and Shapiro (1986).    29 
common  factors.  The  null  hypothesis  that  the  number  of  factors  is  sufficient  is  not 
rejected for both the models with p-values of 0.61 and 0.57 for the two and three common 
factor models respectively. When we consider two factors, we see that the first common 
factor contributes highly to the forecast revisions of South East Asian and North East 
Asian country groups. It also contributes to the Indian and Japanese forecast revisions but 
to a lesser extent. The second common factor contributes highly on EU-3 group and also 
to the USA and the UK. These results imply that when we assume two common factors 
we  observe  two  distinct  business  cycles.  The  first  one  affects  mainly  the  East  Asian 
countries and India, and the second common factor affects the Western countries, i.e. EU-
3, USA and UK. 
With three common factors, the first common factor contributes to NE and SE 
Asian countries as before and the second common factor contributes to EU-3, USA and 
UK as before. The last common factor now contributes mainly to the Indian forecast 
revisions implying that the Indian business cycles may have some distinct movements 
that are not captured by either the East Asian or Western business cycles. Also let us note 
that Western common factor (factor 2) does not contribute any significant amount to the 
Indian real GDP forecast revisions. These results imply that India is affected more by the 
East  Asian  common  factor  than  the  Western  common  factors,  and  it  is  also  largely 
affected by domestic shocks. So far we have assumed that the forecasts are efficient. In 
the  next  section  we  assume  that  the  forecasts  are  not  efficient  in  the  short-run  but 
efficient in the long-run. 
6.2  Under Long-run Efficiency – FSVAR Model Results 
The  estimated  variance  decompositions  are  given  in  Table  8.  The  first 
international common factor seems to be the common factor among US, UK and EU-3 
(Western common factor). The second factor, on the other hand, can be interpreted as the 
common factor across the Asian countries. Especially for South East Asia the importance 
of this second factor is very large. It accounts for 76 percent of the South East Asian real 
GDP growth shocks. Since our sample period covers the Asian financial crisis, it is very 
likely that this second common factor is mainly capturing the common behavior of the 
GDP growth rates of the region countries during the Asian crisis. The Asian crisis started   30 
in Thailand in July 1997 and quickly spread the other South East Asian countries. The 
north east Asian region is affected less by this common shock partly because China is a 
member of this group, which was much less affected compared to other Asian countries. 
India is another country that was not affected much from the Asian crisis but the variance 
decompositions show that while Asian common factor accounts for 38 percent of the 
Indian GDP growth variance, share of domestic shocks in Indian GDP growth is around 
42 percent.  
In the mid 1997 and 1998 we see that current and next year forecasts have very 
large common movements due to Asian crisis, which may cause increased comovement 
of the GDP variations over a short period time. In order to test for the impact of the Asian 
crisis  on  our  estimates,  we  estimate  the  model  after  excluding  the  survey  data  from 
1997.7- 1998.12 period. The results with two common factors are reported in the first 
panel of Table 9. As expected the share of the Asian common factor decreases to 16 
percent and share of domestic shocks become 61 percent. In addition to the decreasing 
effect  of  the  second  common  factor,  we  also  see  that  the  first  common  factor’s 
importance increases for all of the countries including India.
20 After Asian crisis period is 
excluded, what we labeled as the ‘Western’ cycle becomes more like a “world shock” 
that is affecting  all the countries significantly.  Moreover,  results for South East Asia 
region suggest that we may not need the second common factor at all. When we exclude 
the Asian crisis, the share of domestic shocks in South East Asia Region becomes zero 
and factor 1 and factor 2 together explain 85 percent of the total GDP variation in SE-
Asia region, which suggests that the use of only one common factor may be preferable. 
So we estimate the model assuming a single common factor and the results are reported 
in the second panel of the table. The p-value from the LR test for the null hypothesis of a 
single  common factor is now 0.02  and not rejecting the null hypothesis at 1 percent 
significance level. The single common factor now accounts for a significant share of the 
GDP  variation  in  all  of  the  countries.  Since  the  impact  of  the  common  factor  is 
widespread, we can now think of this common factor as a world shock. For India, it 
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are the current and next year forecasts reported on 1998.6 and next year forecasts reported on 1998.5. The 
results are similar to the ones reported in the sense that Asian common factor’s contribution decreases   31 
accounts for 23 percent of the variation while India’s domestic shocks account for 65 
percent of the total variation.  
As mentioned earlier our estimates are biased in favor of finding a large share for 
the common factors and underestimating the impact of individual country shocks. This 
means that the large shares of common factors given in Table 8 and Table 9 in the US 
and EU-3 GDP variations may be actually driven by idiosyncratic shocks of US and/or 
Europe. But our current model does not let us identify this since so far we assume that 
A=I in equation (7). Remember that A matrix shows the contemporaneous utilization of 
news from transmission of idiosyncratic shocks across countries (i.e., spillovers). 
The suspiciously high contribution of the common factor to US and EU-3 real 
GDP variations prompts for a robustness check. To test this we make slight modifications 
to the A matrix in equation (7). We let A have nonzero elements in the column that 
corresponds to the US data, so that we let US shocks to be utilized contemporaneously in 
other countries’ GDP growth forecasts. But if we let US shocks to have an effect on the 
other countries in the model then the impact of common factors and US will not be 
individually identified.
21 In order to identify the model, we need to impose additional 
restrictions onL. Based on our previous findings, we assume that the first common factor 
does  not  have  contemporaneous  impact  on  Japanese  GDP  growth  and  the  second 
common factor does not have contemporaneous impact on EU-3.
22 In this way, degree of 
freedom becomes 9 for the single factor model and 4 for the two-common factor model. 
The results of the estimations along with the corresponding LR test results are presented 
in Table 10. 
The  first  part  of  Table  10  presents  the  results  with  two  common  factors.  As 
expected,  the  share  of  the  US  shocks  on  other  countries  increases.  For  example,  US 
shocks account for 90 percent of the US GDP growth variations and 58 percent of the 
EU-3 GDP growth variations. But still we see that the US shocks do not account for more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
substantially but it does not decrease as much as when we exclude the Asian crisis period altogether. 
21 More specifically, in the variance decompositions the sum of shares of the variances accounted for by the 
common factors and the US will be fixed. So the other countries’ share in the variance decompositions will 
be identified but not between the US and the common factors.  
22 Remember that we have already one restriction on the impact of the second common factor on US.   32 
than 5 percent of the real GDP variations in Asian countries. Also note that the results 
with two common factors are not very reasonable in the sense that idiosyncratic EU-3 
shocks account for less than 1 percent of the EU-3 GDP growth variations. Also the first 
common factor looks irrelevant because, except EU-3, no other country is affected by this 
common shock significantly. Because of these reasons, we also give the results of the 
model with a single common factor in the second part of the table. The results in this 
table imply that the first common factor is a common factor across the Asian countries 
and the US factor is the first or the second largest contributor of the GDP variations in 
most of the countries. But even in this model India seems not to be affected from US 
shocks. In addition, the overidentifying test statistics has a p-value less than 1 percent and 
the null of a single common factor is strongly rejected. 
The finding that India’s GDP shocks are driven mainly by the Asian common 
factor and not by the Western countries is reasonable when India’s ‘Look East Policy’ 
that has been in effect since early 1990s is considered. It is very possible that with the 
signing  of  new  trade  agreements  between  India  and  the  other  Asian  countries,  the 
importance of the Asian factors will increase in the future even more.
23 
So far we have identified the existence of an Asian common factor, but we did not 
discuss what constitutes this “Asian common factor”. Since we only analyze the post 
1995 period we can think of these common factors as regional shocks that affected the 
Asian countries exclusively. The change in the demand for semi-conductors, Japanese 
stagnation,  appreciation  and  depreciation  of  USA  dollar  against  Japanese  yen  and 
European currencies since 1994 which affected most of the Asian countries since their 
currencies are pegged against US dollar can be given as examples. 
7  Concluding Remarks   
In this paper we study the sources of Indian real GDP variations using monthly 
forecast data. Since 1989, the Consensus Economics Service Inc. has been providing such 
data on a number of macroeconomic variables for a large number of countries. Because 
                                                            
23 India has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Nepal, Sri Lanka and, in August 2004, with 
Thailand. Such agreements with other Asian countries including China and Singapore are also underway.    33 
these forecasts come on a monthly basis, the usefulness of such information for real time 
macro-economic  management  (e.g.,  inflation  and  GDP  growth  targeting)  can  not  be 
overemphasized. The track record of automated forecasts based on macro models has 
been disappointing due to structural breaks and specification instability. As a result, there 
has  been  a  renewed  interest  in  survey  forecasts.  Even  though  these  forecasts  tend  to 
respond  to  current  news  well,  they  are  found  to  be  somewhat  sluggish  in  their 
adjustments. Many behavioral and institutional explanations have justified the apparent 
irrationality of these forecasts. 
In order to use the forecast data to extract important information on the economic 
fundamentals, we start our analysis by providing forecast evaluation tests for fixed-event 
forecasts. We propose an econometric framework to analyze monthly fixed-target real 
GDP forecasts of India where forecasts for its major trading partners are also considered 
simultaneously. Our framework is useful not only for testing the forecast efficiency but 
also  to  estimate  the  degree  of  efficiency.  Using  monthly  data  over  January  1995  – 
November 2002, we found that the real GDP forecasts are not fully rational. In addition 
to India, we also considered forecasts for US, UK, European block, Japan, Southeast Asia 
and Northeast Asia to examine if Indian forecasters incorporate news coming from these 
country  blocks  correctly.  Indeed,  our  evidence  suggests,  whereas  the  domestic 
information is incorporated in forecast revisions in a rational manner, foreign news take a 
little longer to be fully reflected in forecast up-dating. Thus, the observed inefficiency in 
Indian real GDP forecasts is due to forecasters’ sluggishness in reacting to foreign news. 
It  takes  nearly  4  months  for  foreign  news  to  get  fully  reflected  in  Indian  forecast 
revisions.  Nevertheless, the quality of these forecasts compare very favorably to those of 
the US and Canada.  
After  detecting  the  degree  of  inefficiency  in  the  forecasts,  we  provide  an 
‘efficiency adjusted’ utilization of cross-country news components and then study the 
transmission of shocks across countries including common international shocks in our 
model.  By  assuming  that  the  forecasters  are  long-run  efficient  we  construct  average 
variance decompositions for Indian real GDP shocks and found that almost 60% of the 
real GDP shocks for India come from foreign countries, and the rest is explained by   34 
domestic shocks. We see that the Asian common factor is the second largest contributor 
after  the  domestic  shocks  accounting  for  38  percent  of  the  Indian  real  GDP  growth 
variations.  However,  when  we  exclude  the  surveys  reported  during  the  Asian  crisis 
(1997.7  to  1998.12),  we  see  that  the  contribution  of  domestic  shocks  increase  to  61 
percent and Asian common factor contributes only 16 percent of the variations, which is 
also the same as the contribution of the Western common factor. The relatively large 
contribution of domestic shocks in consistent with a basic distinguishing characteristic of 
developing countries where much of the forecast revisions can be attributed to volatile 
domestic  shocks  due  to  political  uncertainty,  vagaries  of  monsoon,  natural  disasters, 
monetary policies, budget announcements, data revisions, and the like.  
One advantage of our approach is that the analysis of transmission of shocks is 
studied in real time, and does not depend on the actual values of the variable that are 
observed much later than the forecasts. Apart form the uncertainty due to data revisions, 
any analysis based on forecast errors has very little value in real time   
Much remains to be done in utilizing this multi-country forecast data. In addition 
to  real  GDP,  one  can  also  use  forecast  information  on  inflation,  interest  rates  and 
exchange rates available in the data set to build multivariate models that can discriminate 
between demand shocks and supply shocks. The forecasts for real GDP, inflation and 
exchange rates will move in the same or opposite directions depending on the nature of 
shocks. The type of shocks in turn determines the type of monetary, fiscal, and exchange 
rate  policies  the  government  should  undertake.  Since  these  shocks  can  potentially  be 
identified  on  a  monthly  basis  in  real  time,  appropriate  stabilization  policies  can 
conveniently  be  fine-tuned  for  sound  macroeconomic  management.  Given  all  these 
potential, as years pass, the value of this forecast data is sure to grow like old wine.    35 
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Table 1 Economic Forecasters for India 
·  ANZ Investment Bank  ·  Hindustan Lever 
·  Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi  ·  HSBC Securities 
·  Chase JF  ·  JP Morgan 
·  CDE-DSE Research  ·  Morgan Stanley Asia 
·  Confed of Indian Industry  ·  Natl Cncil Apl Eco Rsrch 
·  Credit Suisse First Bstn  ·  SG Securities 
·  Deutsche Bank  ·  SSB Citibank 
·  Dresdner Bank  ·  Tata Services (DES) 
·  DSP Merrill Lynch  ·  UBS Warburg 
·  Global Insight  ·  UTI Securities 
·  Goldman Sachs Asia  ·  WEFA Group 
 
 
Table 2 Relation between the Calendar year and Fiscal Year (April to March) Forecasts 
      Year = 2000 
      Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  ..……..Dec 
Horizon  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  ,………….,1  Current Year 
Forecast  Target year  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  ,……..,2000 
Horizon  24  23  22  21  20  19  18  17  ,..………,13 
Calendar Year 
Forecast  Next Year 
Forecast  Target year  2001  2001  2001  2001  2001  2001  2001  2001  ……..,2001 
                       
Horizon  3  2  1  12  11  10  9  8  ,…………,4  Current Year 
Forecast  Target year  1999  1999  1999  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  ,……..,2000 
Horizon  15  14  13  24  23  22  21  20  ,………..,16 
Fiscal Year 
Forecast  Next Year 
Forecast  Target year  2000  2000  2000  2001  2001  2001  2001  2001  ,……..,2001 
Note: The gray area shows the data that are not used. 
 
Table 3 Definition of Country Groups and country weights 
Country Group  Countries and GDP shares 
a 
Europe-3  Germany (46%), France (30%) and Italy (24%) 
South East Asia  Indonesia (32.5%), Malaysia (14%), Singapore (13.75%), Thailand (26.6%) 
and Philippines (13.75%) 
North East Asia  China (45%), Hong Kong (8.9%), South Korea (29.5%) Taiwan (16.5%). 
 
a The Europe-3 weights are calculated using the 1995 GDP shares from International Financial Statistics-
February 2002. The remaining weights are computed by regressing the regional total data provided by the 
Asia Pacific Consensus reports on the individual country GDP forecasts using survey data from 2001-2002. 
The shares may not add up to 100% due to rounding.  
 
Table 4 Selection of lag length in VAR  
Model  Akaike-IC 
a  Schwarz IC 
a  2 R  (India)  R
2 (India) 
VAR(1)  -5.34  -4.20  .10  .14 
VAR(2)  -5.14  -2.92  .08  .18 
VAR(3)  -4.71  -1.30  .05  .20 
a Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria statistics for the whole VAR system and not only for the 
equation of India.  
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Table 5 Tests for Overidentifying Restrictions from FSVAR(1) model (k-factor versus unrestricted 
error covariance matrix) 
Number of factors  d.f.  LR Statistic  p-value 
1  14  81.58  .00 
2  8  8.69  .37 
3  3  2.38  .50 
 
 
Table 6Correlations of Forecast Revisions-  
  EU-3  India  Japan  NE-Asia  SE-Asia  UK  USA 
EU-3  1.00             
India  0.12  1.00           
Japan  0.49  0.31  1.00         
NE-Asia  0.14  0.38  0.33  1.00       
SE-Asia  0.16  0.39  0.40  0.75  1.00     
UK  0.75  0.14  0.43  0.24  0.30  1.00   
USA  0.59  0.11  0.38  0.31  0.21  0.47  1.00 
 
 
Table 7 Static Factor Analysis 
  2 Factors  3 Factors 
  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
EU-3  0.05  0.91  0.03  0.88  0.07 
India  0.42  0.11  0.25  0.06  0.97 
Japan  0.40  0.28  0.35  0.29  0.21 
NE-Asia  0.81  0.29  0.75  0.31  0.18 
SE-Asia  0.94  0.04  0.97  0.05  0.16 
UK  0.28  0.50  0.26  0.51  0.05 
USA  0.18  0.64  0.16  0.66  0.03 
 
Note:  Table  presents  the  factor  patterns  estimated  by  Maximum  Likelihood  estimation  and  that  are 
transformed using an orthogonal transformation (Varimax). The test statistics for the null hypothesis on the 
sufficiency of the number of factors have p-values 0.61 and 0.57 for the two and three factor models 
respectively, not rejecting the null hypothesis. Entries greater than 0.5 are shown in bold. 
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Table 8 Steady State Variance Decompositions for all countries from FSVAR(1) model with 2 
common factors (full sample results) 
 
Two Common Factors  
(Over Identification test p-value=0.37) 
 
Source of the shock: 
Impact on: 
Factor 1  Factor 2  US  Japan  EU-3  UK  SE-Asia  NE-Asia  India 
US  52%  0%  40%  2%  0%  1%  1%  2%  2% 
Japan  13%  34%  1%  36%  2%  3%  1%  9%  1% 
EU-3  65%  3%  1%  0%  14%  9%  1%  1%  5% 
UK  25%  6%  1%  1%  0%  65%  1%  0%  2% 
SE-Asia  5%  76%  1%  1%  2%  3%  9%  4%  0% 
NE-Asia  14%  56%  0%  0%  2%  3%  2%  22%  0% 
India  8%  38%  0%  1%  2%  5%  1%  3%  42% 
 
Note: Steady-state variance decompositions are calculated from 31-period ahead forecast error variance 
shares (from squares of the aggregated impulse responses) of the FSVAR (1) model with two common 
factors. The largest two contributions for each country are shown in bold. 
 
 
Table 9 Steady State Variance Decompositions for all countries from FSVAR(1) model (Excluding 
the Asian Crisis 1997.7- 1998.12 survey data) 
 
Two Common Factors  
(Over Identification test p-value=0.45) 
 
Source of shock: 
Impact on 
Factor 1  Factor 2  US  Japan  EU-3  UK  SE-Asia  NE-Asia  India 
US  61%  0%  26%  2%  0%  1%  0%  8%  2% 
Japan  34%  22%  0%  31%  0%  1%  0%  7%  4% 
EU-3  72%  0%  0%  0%  8%  6%  0%  6%  7% 
UK  36%  13%  2%  0%  1%  43%  0%  2%  3% 
SE-Asia  37%  48%  0%  0%  1%  1%  0%  10%  2% 
NE-Asia  41%  24%  1%  1%  1%  1%  0%  30%  2% 
India  16%  16%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  3%  61% 
 
 
One common Factor  
(Over Identification test p-value=0.02) 
 
Source of shock 
Impact on: 
Factor 1  US  Japan  EU-3  UK  SE-Asia  NE-Asia  India 
US  63%  25%  2%  0%  1%  0%  7%  2% 
Japan  48%  0%  34%  1%  1%  5%  7%  4% 
EU-3  68%  0%  0%  13%  7%  0%  6%  7% 
UK  42%  2%  0%  1%  46%  4%  1%  4% 
SE-Asia  51%  0%  1%  2%  1%  33%  10%  2% 
NE-Asia  54%  1%  1%  1%  1%  11%  29%  2% 
India  23%  0%  0%  1%  2%  5%  3%  65% 
Note: Steady-state variance decompositions are calculated from 31-period ahead forecast error variance   42 
shares (from squares of the aggregated impulse responses) of the FSVAR (1) model with one and two 
common factors. The surveys that are reported between July-1997 and December-1998 are excluded from 
the analysis. The largest two contributions for each country are shown in bold. 
 
 
Table 10 Steady State Variance Decompositions for all countries from FSVAR-US (1) model when 
Forecast Horizon for India ³ ³ ³ ³ 6  
 
Two common Factors  
(Over Identification test p-value=0.28) 
 
Source of the shock 
Impact on: 
Factor 1  Factor 2  US  Japan  EU-3  UK  SE-Asia  NE-Asia  India 
US  2%  0%  90%  2%  0%  1%  1%  2%  2% 
Japan  1%  42%  4%  37%  0%  3%  1%  9%  1% 
EU-3  24%  0%  58%  0%  0%  10%  1%  1%  5% 
UK  2%  13%  10%  1%  0%  71%  1%  0%  2% 
SE-Asia  3%  77%  0%  1%  0%  3%  12%  4%  0% 
NE-Asia  1%  68%  3%  0%  0%  4%  2%  21%  0% 
India  1%  45%  2%  1%  0%  5%  2%  3%  42% 
 
 
One common Factor  
(Over Identification test p-value=0.00) 
 
Source of the shock 
Impact on: 
Factor 1  US  Japan  EU-3  UK  SE-Asia  NE-Asia  India 
US  1%  90%  2%  1%  1%  2%  1%  2% 
Japan  33%  14%  37%  4%  4%  3%  5%  1% 
EU-3  0%  43%  0%  35%  12%  3%  1%  6% 
UK  8%  11%  1%  1%  77%  2%  0%  2% 
SE-Asia  56%  7%  1%  5%  3%  26%  2%  0% 
NE-Asia  61%  15%  0%  4%  4%  4%  10%  0% 
India  35%  8%  1%  3%  5%  3%  2%  42% 
Note: Steady-state variance decompositions are calculated from 31-period ahead forecast error variance 
shares (from squares of the aggregated impulse responses) of the FSVAR-US (1) model with one and two 
common factors. The largest two contributions for each country are shown in bold. 
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Figure 5 Generalized Impulse Responses of Indian Forecast Revisions 
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Figure 6 Intertemporal Variance Decompositions from exactly identified VAR(1)  and 95% 
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